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Abstract
We apply a variant of the microeconometric decomposition methodology proposed in
Bourguignon et al. (1998) to assess the relevance of various factors that affected
inequality in the period 1986-1998 in the Greater Buenos Aires area. The results of the
paper suggest that the small change in inequality between 1986 and 1992 was the result
of mild forces that compensated each other. In contrast, between 1992 and 1998 nearly
all factors played in the same direction. Changes in the returns to education and
experience, changes in the endowments of unobservable factors and their returns,
changes in hours of work and in labor force participation, and the transformation of the
educational structure of the population have all had some role in increasing inequality in
Argentina to unprecedented levels. The increase in the returns to education, changes in
endowments of unobservable factors and their remunerations, and the fall in hours of
work by low-income people are particularly important to explain the growth in inequality
in the nineties. In contrast, although Argentina witnessed dramatic changes in the
gender wage gap, the unemployment rate and the educational structure, these factors
appear to have had only a mild effect on the household income distribution.
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21. Introduction
The main economic variables have widely oscillated in the last two decades in Argentina in
association with deep macroeconomic and structural transformations. After reaching a peak of
172% monthly in 1989, the inflation rate decreased to less than 1% yearly in a few years; GDP
drastically fell at the end of the eighties and then grew at unprecedented rates in the first half of the
nineties; unemployment rose steadily from around 5% to 14% in a short period of time. Income
inequality was not an exception in this turbulent period. The Gini coefficient increased from 41.9 to
46.7 between 1986 and 1989, fell to 40.0 towards 1991, and rose steadily in the following 7 years,
reaching a record level of 47.4 in 1998.1 It is difficult to find in recent economic history periods with
such marked changes in inequality, in Argentina as well as in the rest of the world.
The reasons of these changes in inequality are varied and complex. The main aim of this
paper is to assess the relevance of some forces that are believed to have affected income inequality in
the Greater Buenos Aires area between 1986 and 1998. More specifically, the microeconometric
decomposition methodology proposed by Bourguignon, Ferreira and Lustig (1998) is used to
measure the relevance of various factors that appear to have driven changes in inequality. In
particular, this methodology is used to identify to what extent changes in the returns to education and
experience, in endowments of unobservable factors (such as individual’s innate ability) and their
returns, in the wage gap between men and women, in labor market participation and hours of work,
and in the educational structure of the population contribute to explain the observed changes in
income distribution.
The results of the paper suggest that the observed similarity between the inequality indexes of
1986 and 1992 is in fact the consequence of mild forces that operated in different directions, but
compensated each other in the aggregate. On the contrary, between 1992 and 1998 nearly all the
determinants under study have contributed to increase inequality. The increase in the returns to
education, a higher dispersion in the endowments and/or the returns to unobservable factors and the
dramatic fall in the hours of work of less-skilled low-income people appear to be the dominating
forces. Perhaps surprisingly, neither the narrowing of the gender wage gap nor the increase in average
education of the population were significant equalizing factors. Also, the dramatic jump in
unemployment in the nineties does not appear to have had a very significant direct effect on
household income inequality.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 shows the basic facts and discusses
some factors that might have affected inequality in the last two decades. Section 3 presents the
decomposition methodology implemented to assess the relevance of those factors, while section 4
explains the estimation strategy. The main results of the analysis are presented in section 5. The paper
concludes with some brief final comments in section 6.
2. Income inequality in Argentina: basic facts and sources of changes
                                                
1 These values correspond to the distribution of the equivalent household income in the Greater Buenos Aires.
3Income inequality in Argentina has fluctuated considerably around an increasing trend initiated in the
mid-seventies. Figure 2.1 shows the Gini coefficient of equivalent household income between 1985
and 1998.2,3 All figures are calculated based on the Permanent Household Survey (Encuesta
Permanente de Hogares, EPH) for the Greater Buenos Aires area, elaborated by the local National
Institute of Statistics and Census (INDEC). After a substantial increase in the late eighties, inequality
plunged in the first two years of the nineties. A new stage of rising inequality started in 1992 and has
not stopped yet. Argentina has never experienced the level of income inequality reached in 1998, at
least since reliable household data sets are available.4
For simplicity this study is focused on three years separated by equal intervals: 1986, 1992
and 1998. Also, we restrict the analysis to labor income mainly for two reasons.5 (i) The EPH has
various deficiencies in capturing capital income, and (ii) modeling capital income and retirement
payments is not an easy task, especially considering the scarce information contained in the EPH. We
also ignore those households whose heads or spouses are older than 65 or receive retirement
payments. Summing up, we concentrate on the distribution of individual labor income and on the
distribution of equivalent household labor income in 1986, 1992 and 1998 in the Greater Buenos
Aires area.
Table 2.1 shows the basic facts to be characterized in the paper: inequality in individual labor
income and in equivalent household labor income, as measured by the Gini, did not change very much
between 1986 and 1992; on the contrary, both measures rose dramatically in the next six years.6
Gasparini and Sosa Escudero (1999) use bootstrap methods to show that it is possible to reject the
null hypothesis that the Gini coefficients of 1986 and 1998 are equal. While the same is true for 1992
and 1998, one cannot reject the null hypothesis that the Gini coefficients of 1986 and 1992 are equal.
A countless number of factors may have caused the changes in inequality documented in table
2.1. We will concentrate in six of them: (i) changes in the returns to education, (ii) changes in the
gender wage gap, 7 (iii) changes in the returns to experience, (iv) changes in the dispersion of the
endowment of unobservable factors and their returns, (v) changes in hours of work and in labor
market participation, and (vi) changes in the education of the working-able population.
2.1.  Returns to education
                                                
2 Following Buhmann et al. (1988) the equivalent household income is obtained by dividing household income by
the number of equivalent adults (taken from INDEC) raised to .8, a parameter which implies mild household
economies of scale.
3 The use of other indices do not change the main conclusions driven from the graph. See Gasparini and Sosa
Escudero (1999).
4 These broad trends are also reported by other authors. See Altimir, Beccaria and Gonzalez Rozada (1999),
Gasparini (1999), Lee (1999) and Llach and Montoya (1999).
5 Labor income comprises wage earnings and self-employed earnings.
6 All households with valid incomes (including those with no income) are considered in the equivalent household
labor income statistics. Ignoring those with zero income does not alter the main results (see our companion paper,
Gasparini, Marchionni and Sosa Escudero (1999)). Only workers with positive earnings are included in the
individual labor income statistics. Results in table 2.1 are robust to changes in inequality indices (see our
companion paper).
7 Throughout the paper “wage” refers to hourly labor income earned by wage-workers and self-employed workers.
4An increase in the returns to education implies a widening of the wage gap between high and low-
educated workers, which in turn would imply a more unequal distribution of individual earnings and
probably a more unequal distribution of household income. Table 2.2 shows hourly earnings in real
terms for workers between 14 and 65 with valid and complete answers. The average wage fell 19%
between 1986 and 1992 and increased 9.3% in the next six years. Changes were not uniform among
educational groups. While in the first period of the analysis the most dramatic drop in hourly earnings
was for the college complete group, that group enjoyed the greatest increase in wages during period
1992-1998. Table 2.2 is a first piece of evidence that changes in relative wages among schooling
groups implied a decrease in hourly earnings inequality between 1986 and 1992 and an increase
thereafter.
Table 2.3 shows the results of Mincerian log hourly earnings functions estimated using the
Heckman procedure to correct for sample selection. The first three columns refer to household heads
(mostly men) and the rest to spouses (nearly all women) and other members of the family (roughly
half men and half women), respectively. Since the EPH does not record years of education we
include educational dummies that capture the maximum level achieved. The omitted category is
primary incomplete. A gender dummy, age and age squared and a dummy for youths less than 18
years old (only relevant for other members) are also included in the regression. In addition to those
variables, the selection equation includes marital status, number of children and a dummy that takes
the value 1 when the individual attends school. Following Bourguignon et al. (1999) it is assumed that
labor market participation choices are made within the household in a sequential fashion. Spouses
take the heads labor market status into consideration to decide whether to enter the labor market or
not. Other members of the family consider both the head and the spouse labor market status.
The coefficients of all educational levels are positive, significant and increasing with the
educational level, that is, the returns to education are always positive.8 For family heads in 1998, an
individual with complete elementary school had a hourly wage 18% greater than an individual with
incomplete elementary education, keeping all other factors constant. The same figure for incomplete
high school, complete high school, incomplete college and complete college education is 36%, 65%,
94% and 146%, respectively, all with respect to the base category. It is interesting to observe that in
many cases returns to education are increasing, that is, the hourly wage gap between educational
levels increases with education.9 For the case of family heads in 1998 the difference in wages
between an individual with complete elementary school and one with incomplete high school is 18%,
whereas the difference between this level and complete high school is 29%. The greatest jump is
between incomplete and complete college (52%).
Figure 2.2 shows the predicted hourly earnings for all different educational levels. The first
panel refers to male heads and the second to other male members, both with age kept constant at 40.
                                                
8 We refer as “returns to education” the change in hourly wages due to a change in the educational level (and not
in years of education). It takes around 7 years to complete the primary school, 5 or 6 additional years to complete
high-school and around  5 years to complete college.
9 The increasing returns to education could be due to a selectivity bias in the schooling decision. High-ability
people have less costs of acquiring knowledge, and hence are more prone to make a higher human capital
investment.
5The wage-education profiles for family heads have a marked positive slope and are almost parallel
everywhere, except for the substantial increase in the slope between 1992 and 1998 in the highest
educational levels. This certainly contributes to increase earnings inequality among household heads
with different educational levels. For male other-members the wage-education profile became flatter
between 1986 and 1992 and substantially more steeper and convex in the next 6 years. The latter
movement could imply a dramatic widening of the earnings gap by educational level.
Figure 2.3 shows the profiles for 40 years old females. As in the case of men the wage-
education profiles show a decreasing slope between 1986 and 1992, and an opposite movement
between 1992 and 1998. The increase in convexity in 1998 is particularly evident for other members.
Summarizing, there is evidence of a positive relationship between hourly earnings and
education which induces differences in incomes among individuals with different education. According
to the evidence presented these differences have shrunk between 1986 and 1992, and have
substantially increased in the next 6 years. The wage-education profile has become steeper and more
convex. Although this phenomenon seems widespread across groups, it appears to be particularly
relevant for the group of other members of the household.
2.2.  Gender wage gap
Table 2.4 presents mean hourly wages by gender. Wages were higher for males in every year. In
1986 females’ hourly wage was on average 86% of males’. This gap narrowed over time and in
1998 females’ wages were on average 98% of males’.10
A conditional analysis also shows a shrinking gap for household heads. From table 2.3 the
coefficient for the male dummy is always positive and significant, but clearly decreasing over time.
Surprisingly, the time pattern is the opposite for other members. However, since the number of
working individuals in this group is much less than in the household heads group, the global conclusion
of a narrowing gender wage gap holds. This shrinking gap has undoubtedly been an equalizing factor
on the individual earnings distribution. The effect of that phenomenon on the equivalent household
labor income distribution will basically depend on the position of working women in that distribution.
Section 5 has more on that.
2.3  Returns to experience (age)
Age is used in this paper as a proxy for experience. Table 2.5 shows the average hourly earnings for
different age groups. In general the wage-age profile has an inverted U shape. Between 1986 and
1992 hourly wages fell, most significantly for older individuals, who are also the richest ones in terms
of hourly wages. The youngest workers, who are the worst-paid, were the least damaged by the
generalized wage drop. In principle this would imply an equalizing effect on the earnings distribution.
However, these two groups together represent less than 9% of the total working population. For the
rest of that population changes in hourly earnings did not follow a definite pattern.
Between 1992 and 1998 hourly wages grew for workers older than 30 and fell for the rest,
which would imply an unequalizing effect. However, by far the most-favored group by the wage
                                                
10 Actually, for family heads and other members this difference disappeared in 1998.
6increase was the 50-59. This implies an equalizing force since the average wage of this group in 1992
was relatively low.
So far the probable effect of changes in returns to experience on inequality has not been
clear. The coefficients of age and age squared in the log hourly earnings equation of table 2.3 provide
more elements to the analysis. Particularly interesting is the substantial increase in the coefficient of
age for household heads between 1986 and 1992 and the fall in that coefficient for spouses. Keeping
all other things constant, this change would imply a widening of the wage gap between heads and
spouses driven by differential changes in the returns to experience. Since heads’ wages are
substantially higher than spouses’, the mentioned change in returns would be an unequalizing factor.
An exactly opposite change in coefficients took place between 1992 and 1998, leading to an
equalizing effect.
Summing up, there are some reasons to believe that changes in the returns to experience have
led to higher inequality and some reasons to believe the opposite. The analysis of section 5 will help
us to assess the quantitative relevance of each argument.
2.4.  Unobservables
Earnings equations allow the estimation of returns to observable factors like education and
experience. The error term is usually interpreted as capturing the joint effect of the endowment of
non-observable factors (like individual ability) and its market value on earnings. In general terms, the
variance of this error term captures the contribution of dispersion in unobservable factors to general
inequality. Table 2.3 reports the standard deviation of the error terms of each log hourly earnings
equation (labeled as “sigma”).  For instance, for household heads the standard deviation took a value
of .55 in 1986, .57 in 1992, and .64 in 1998. The substantial increase between 1992 and 1998 is
also present in the spouses and other members equations. According to these results the effect of
changes in unobservable factors would have been mildly unequalizing between 1986 and 1992, and
substantially unequalizing the next 6 years.
2.5. Employment
The period under analysis has witnessed a slight fall in weekly hours of work: 1 hour between 1986
and 1992 and less than half an hour in the next six years. That fall was not uniform across workers.
Table 2.6 clasifies workers by labor income quintiles and records the average hours of work of each
group. While there is not a clear pattern of changes between 1986 and 1992, the nineties have
witnessed a dramatic fall in hours of work by low-income workers. This change would have a non
negligible unequalizing effect in the individual earnings distribution.
A conditional analysis yields similar results. Figure 2.4 shows predicted weekly hours of work
for male heads and female spouses from the Tobit censored data model presented in table 2.7. While
hours clearly decreased between 1986 and 1998 for the less-educated male heads workers, changes
in hours for the rest of the educational groups were only marginal. The fall in hours of work for low-
educated female spouses was also greater than for the rest of the groups.
7Household income inequality can change not only after changes in hours of work but also as a
result of changes in labor market participation. This is a particularly interesting point to study in the
Argentinean case, since the dramatic jump in the unemployment rate in the nineties is thought to be
the main responsible of the increase in inequality by many analysts.
In table 2.8 individuals are grouped according to whether they are employed, unemployed or
inactive. The percentage of unemployed individuals rose from 2.3% in 1986 to 6.5% in 1998.11 The
major increase took place between 1992 and 1998. However, notice an interesting fact: the increase
in unemployment was not accompanied by a fall in the employment rate, since there was a big drop in
inactivity. Despite the mentioned jump in the unemployment rate, the proportion of working-able
people with zero income remained roughly unchanged between 1986 and 1998. Notice that for
inequality measures it is irrelevant whether the individual has zero income because she is unemployed
or because she is not looking for a job.
Table 2.8 suggests three different stories in the labor market for heads, spouses and other
members. Some household heads lost or quit their jobs, especially in the last 6 years, becoming either
unemployed or out of the labor force. In contrast many of the spouses left their homes in search of a
job: most of them found one between 1986 and 1992, but some of them did not in the 1992-1998
period. The other members of the family were less lucky: nearly all of them who started to look for a
job became unemployed (or displaced another individual in that category).
Table 2.9 presents the proportion of adults employed, unemployed and inactive by
educational group. Neither changes in unemployment rate nor changes in the proportion of people
with zero income have clear patterns across educational groups. In principle, there are no clear signs
that the strong increase in unemployment, especially during 1992-1998, has translated into a
disproportionately increase in adults with no income in the low-education low-income group. The
results of the selection equations in table 2.3 are in line with this conclusion.
Summing up, while differential changes in hours of work seem to have had a significant
unequalizing effect on the earnings distribution, and hence probably on the household labor income
distribution, the effect of changes in participation rates is not clear. It is possible that despite the
enormous increase in unemployment rates in the Greater Buenos Aires area, changes in participation
rates had had a negligible effect on inequality.
2.6. Education
In Argentina, as in many developing countries, substantial changes in the educational composition of
the population have been taking place in the last decades. Table 2.10 presents the proportion of
individuals between 14 and 65 years old by educational level. Between 1986 and 1998 there was a
strong contraction in the proportion of youth and adults with elementary education (both complete or
incomplete), which are groups with relatively low hourly wages. Simultaneously, between these years
the proportion of individuals in all other educational groups increased, particularly in the college
(incomplete or complete) group.
                                                
11 This implies an unemployment rate of 2.3 in 1986 and 9.8 in 1998. These figures refer to our restricted sample.
The unemployment rates reported by INDEC for the entire EPH are somewhat higher every year.
8Education is usually viewed as an equalizing force. The traditional argument points out that
income disparities in one generation can be reduced in the next one if poor children have access to
more and better education, so that the educational gap with rich-families children narrows down. But
following Kuznets (1955) one can tell a different story if the high-educated rich are a minority and
only some poor children manage to make it all the way up to the highest educational (and income)
levels. In that case it is likely that inequality grows as the average education of the population
increases, at least until the high education group is relatively big. With multiple educational levels a
similar unequalizing outcome emerges if there is a net outflow from the lowest educational levels and a
similar net inflow to the highest levels, with minor changes in the intermediate levels. Changes in the
educational structure from 1992 to 1998 have more or less taken that form, which feeds the
presumption of an unequalizing education effect. Ten percent of the adults population left the primary
education group, while six percent entered the college group. Changes from 1986 to 1992 are less
clear, since five percent left the primary education group but less than half of that fraction entered the
college group.
To have a sense of the results to expect we simulated a distribution where every worker gets
the average earning of its educational group. In 1992 the Gini coefficient of that distribution is 15.1. If
we keep the 1992 wages but use the 1998 educational structure, the Gini grows to 16.4, implying an
unequalizing effect. The same exercise applied to 1986 and 1992 yields an insignificant change.12
So far we have analyzed several factors that might have affected inequality. Although we have
offered some evidence to argue about each effect we still do not have a consistent framework where
to confirm the sign of each effect and where to assess its quantitative relevance. Were changes in the
returns to education really an unequalizing force? Were they really a significant force? What about the
gender, the employment or the education effects? The next section presents a framework to tackle
these questions.
3.  The methodology
To assess the relevance of the various factors discussed in the previous section on income inequality
changes, we adapt the microeconometric decomposition methodology first proposed by
Bourguignon, Ferreira and Lustig (1998) to our case.13
Let Yit  be individual’s i labor income at time t, which can be written as a function F of  the
vector Xit of individual characteristics affecting wages and employment, the vector eit of unobservable
                                                
12 As another exercise we took the 1992 distribution and moved all individuals one step in the educational ladder
(from secondary incomplete to secondary complete and so on). In that case the Gini coefficient of individual
earnings does not move (from 37.68 to 37.38) while the Gini of the equivalent household income falls just from
41.04 to  40.15.
13 Variants of the basic methodology have been applied in Altimir, Beccaria and González Rozada (1999),
Bourguignon, Gurgand and Fournier (1999), Bouillon, Legovini and Lustig (1998), Ferreira and Paes de Barros
(1999) and González Rozada and Menéndez (1999), among others.
9characteristics, the vector bt of parameters that determine market hourly wages and the vector lt of
parameters that affect employment outcomes (participation and hours of work).
(1)                                              ),,,( ttititit XFY lbe=               i=1,...,N
The distribution of individual labor income can be represented as
(2)                                               { }Nttt YYD ,...,1=
We can simulate individual labor incomes by changing one or some parameters in equation (1). For
instance, the following expression represents labor income that individual’s i would have earned in
time t if the parameters determining wages had been those of time t’, keeping all other things
constant.
(3)                                              Y F Xit t it it t t( ) ( , , , )' 'b e b l=               i=1,...,N
More generally, we can define Yit(k t’) where k is any parameter or set of parameters in (1). Hence,
the simulated distribution will be
(4)                                              { }D k Y k Y kt t t t Nt t( ) ( ),..., ( )' ' '= 1
The contribution to the overall change in the distribution of a change in k between t and t‘, holding all
else constant, can be obtained by comparing (2) and (4). Although we can make the comparisons in
terms of the whole distributions, in this paper we compare inequality indices I(D). Therefore, the
effect of a change in parameter k is defined by14
(5)                                              E k I D I D kt t t t t( ) ( ) ( ( ))' 'º -
As it was discussed in the previous section this paper is devoted to discuss the following effects:
(i)  Returns to education (k = bed): it measures the effect of changes in the parameters that relate
education to hourly wages (bed) on inequality.
(ii)  Gender wage gap (k = bg): the same as (i) but with gender.
(iii)  Returns to experience (k = bex): the same as (i) but with experience.
(iv)  Overall price (k=b): it measures the effect of changes in all the parameters determining wages
on inequality.
(v)  Returns to unobservable factors (k = ew): it measures the effect of changes in the unobservable
factors and their remunerations affecting hourly wages (ew) on inequality.
                                                
14 In the empirical implementation we compute the labor income distribution only for those individuals such that
Yit>0 and Yit(k t’)>0.
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(vi)  Employment (k = l): it measures the effect of changes in the parameters that determine
participation and hours of work on inequality.
(vii)  Education (k = Xed): it measures the effect of changes in the educational levels of the population
on inequality.
A definitional exact decomposition is
(6)                                              I D I D E k Rt t t t
k
( ) ( ) ( )' '- º +å          k = Xed, ew, b, l
The previous discussion refers to the distribution of individual earnings. However, it is probably more
relevant from a social point of view to study the distribution of household income since a person’s
utility usually depends not on her own earnings but on her household income and demographic
composition. Following Buhmann et al. (1988) equivalent household income is given by
(7)                                              ( )Y Y Y aihtq jt jt
j h
j
j h
= +
æ
è
ç
ö
ø
÷
Î Î
å å0 /
q
                           i=1,...,N
where Yq stands for equivalent household income, h is the household, Y0 is income from other
sources, a is the equivalent adult and q captures household economies of scale. The distribution of
equivalent household income can be expressed as
(8)                                              { }D Y Ytq tq Ntq= 1 ,...
Changing parameter k to its value in t’ yields the following simulated equivalent household income in
year t.
(9)                                              ( )Y k Y k Y aihtq t jt t jt
j h
j
j h
( ) ( )' ' /= +
æ
è
ç
ö
ø
÷
Î Î
å å0
q
              i=1,...,N
Hence, the simulated distribution is
(10)                                             { }D k Y k Y ktq t tq t tq t( ) ( ), ..., ( )' ' '= 1 1
The effect of a change in parameter k, holding all else constant, on equivalent household inequality is
given by15
                                                
15 In the empirical implementation we ignore income from other sources Yjt
o and we consider all individuals such
that Yqit³0 and Yqit(k t’)³0.
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q
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q
t( ) ( ) ( ( ))' '= -
4. Estimation strategy
In order to compute expressions (5) and (11) we need to have estimates of parameters b and l and
the residual terms e. Also, since we do not have panels we need a mechanism to assign observable
and unobservable individual characteristics in period t’ to individuals in t. This section is devoted to
explain the strategies to deal with these problems.
Estimation of b, l and e
Let’s denote with Li the number of hours worked by person i, and with wi the hourly wage
perceived. Total labor income is given by Yi = Li.wi. The number of hours of work Li comes from an
utility maximization process which determines optimal participation in the labor market, whereas
wages are determined by market forces. The estimation stage specifies models for wages and hours
of work which are used in the simulation stage described above.
The econometric specification of the model is similar to the one used by Bourguignon et al.
(1999), which corresponds to the reduced form of the labor decisions model originally proposed by
Heckman (1974). In this work, Heckman shows how it is possible to derive an estimable reduced
form starting from a structural system obtained form a utility maximization problem of labor-
consumption decisions. Leaving technical details aside, the scheme proposed by Heckman has the
following structure. Individuals allocate hours to work and domestic activities (or leisure) so as to
maximize their utility subject to time, wealth, wages and other constraints. As usual, the solution to
this optimization problem can be characterized as demand relations for goods and leisure as functions
of the relevant prices. Under general conditions it is possible to invert these functions to obtain prices
and wages as functions of quantities of goods and leisure consumed (or its counterpart, hours of
work). In particular, the wages obtained in this fashion (denoted as w*) are to be interpreted as
marginal valuations of labor, which will be a function of hours of work and other personal
characteristics, and represent the minimum wage for which the individual would accept to work a
determined number of hours. In equilibrium, if the individual decides to work, the number of hours
devoted to labor should equate their marginal value w* with the wage effectively perceived. On the
contrary, if the individual decides not to work it is because this marginal value is greater than the wage
offered, given her personal characteristics.
This discussion suggests how to determine wages asked by individuals. In parallel it is
possible to model market determinants of wages offered (w) as function of characteristics such as
years of education, experience and age as a standard Mincer equation (Mincer, 1974). In equilibrium
it is assumed that the number of hours of work adjusts to make w=w*.
The demand-supply relations discussed so far are structural forms in the sense that they
reflect relevant economic behavior in which wages offered and asked depend on the number of hours
12
of work, which equate in equilibrium. Under general conditions it is possible to derive a reduced form
for the equilibrium relations, in which wages and hours of work are expressed as functions of the
variables taken as exogenous. In this way, the model has two equations, one for wages (w*) and one
for the number of hours of work (L*), both as function of factors taken as given which affect wages
(X1) and hours (X2) which may or may not have elements in common. The error terms e1 and e2 will
represent non-observable factors affecting the determination of endogenous variables.
According to the characteristics of the problem, for a particular individual we observe
positive values of w* and L* if and only if the individual actually works. If the person does not work,
we only know that the offered wage is smaller than the salary asked. Consequently, the reduced form
model for wages and hours of work is specified as:
(12)                        wi* = X1ib + e1i i = 1,...,N
(13)                            Li* =  X2il + e2i
with
wi = wi*    if   Li* > 0
wi = 0       if  Li* £ 0
Li =  Li*    if  Li* > 0
Li = 0       if  Li* £ 0
where wi and Li correspond to observed wages and hours of work respectively. This notation
emphasizes that, consistently with the data used for the estimation, observed wages for a non-
working individual are zero.
Following Heckman (1979), for estimation purposes we will assume that ei1 and ei2 have a
bivariate normal distribution with E(e1i)=E(e2i)=0, variances s12 and s22 and correlation coefficient r.
This particular specification corresponds to the “Tobit type III” model in Amemiya’s (1985)
classification.
 Even though it is possible to estimate all the parameters using a full information maximum
likelihood method, we adopted a limited information approach, which has notorious computational
advantages. If instead of hours of work we had only information about whether the individual works
or not, the model would correspond to the “Type II” model in Amemiya’s classification, whose
parameters can be estimated based on a simple selectivity model. More specifically, the regression
equation would be the wage equation and the selection equation would be a censored version of the
labor supply equation, simply indicating whether the individual works or not. Table 2.3 shows the
estimation results of these equations for our case.
On the other hand the hours of work equation corresponds to the “Tobit type I” model in
Amemiya’s classification where the variable is observed only if it is positive. In this case, the
parameters of interest could be estimated using a standard censored regression Tobit model.  This
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strategy is consistent though not fully efficient. In any case, the efficiency loss is not necessarily
significant for a small sample. The results of the estimation are shown in table 2.7.
Changes in unobservables
Unobservable characteristics affecting wages are modeled as regression error terms of the wage
equation (12). Their mean is trivially normalized to zero and their variance is estimated as an extra
parameter in the Heckman procedure. The effect of changes in characteristics of the distribution of
unobservables (like the variance) is captured in the following way. The estimated residuals of the
wage equation of year t are rescaled by st´/st, where sj is the estimated standard deviation of the
wage equation corresponding to year j. This captures the effect of differences between years in
dispersion in the unobservable factor affecting wages, which include non-observables factors and
their market value.16
Nevertheless, this procedure cannot be applied to individuals that do not work, for which we
do not observe positive wages and hence, the residual term. For each individual in this group, we
assign as “error term” a random draw from the bivariate normal distribution implicit in the wage-labor
supply model (12)-(13), whose parameters are consistently estimated by the Heckman procedure.
Residuals are sampled from the distribution of unobservables but conditional on the fact that the
behavior of the individual is observed. That is, error terms are drawn from the bivariate normal
distribution and a prediction (based on observable characteristics, estimated parameters and sampled
errors) is computed for wages and hours worked. If the resulting prediction yields positive hours
worked (so the prediction is inconsistent with observed behavior in this group), the error term is
sampled again until non-positive hours of work are predicted.
Individual characteristics
For the estimation of the education effect it is necessary to simulate the educational structure of year
t´ on year t population since we do not have the same individuals in both years. Instead of following
Bourguignon et al. (1999) and estimating a parametric equation that relates individual educational
level to other individual characteristics (basically age and gender), we apply a rough non parametric
mechanism. We divide the adult population in ten homogeneous groups by gender and age and then
we replicate the educational structure of a given cell in year t’ into the corresponding cell in year t.17
5. Results
                                                
16 It is important to remark that under bivariate normal assumption implicit in the Heckman model, once the
correlation between unobservables affecting wages and hours worked is kept constant, all remaining effects on
unobservables on wages come through the variance. Machado and Mata (1998) allow for hetereogeneous
behavior of the error term using quantile regression methods.
17 It might be worth noticing that the unobservables are kept at their estimated values for year t.
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This section reports the results of performing the decomposition described in section 3 using the
estimation strategy outlined in section 4. The objective is to shed light over the quantitative relevance
of the various phenomena discussed in section 2 on inequality changes in period 1986-1998.
Before showing the results two explanations are in order. First, the decompositions are path
dependent. Hence, we report the results using alternatively t and t’ as the base year. Second, the
simulations are carried out for the whole distribution. To save space we only show the results for the
Gini coefficient. There are not significant variations when other indices are used.18 Tables 5.1 to 5.3
show the results both with t and t´ as base years. Table 5.4 reports the average of these results. A
positive number indicates an unequalizing effect.19 Results are shown for the distribution of both
individual earnings and equivalent household income. These tables help us to assess the significance of
each factor on inequality changes.
Table 5.4
Decomposition of the change in the Gini coefficient
Average results changing the base year
                   Individual earnings   Equivalent household income
86-92 92-98 86-98 86-92 92-98 86-98
Observed -1.7 7.2 5.5 0.7 8.5 9.2
Effects 
1. Price -0.7 3.0 2.1 -0.5 2.7 2.0
    education -1.0 2.9 1.8 -0.9 2.8 1.8
    gender -1.0 -0.4 -1.4 0.1 -0.1 0.0
    experience 1.7 -0.9 0.4 -0.5 0.7 0.3
    rest -0.4 1.5 1.2 0.7 -0.8 0.0
2. Unobservables 0.5 2.0 2.5 0.4 1.7 2.1
3. Employment -0.3 2.4 2.2 1.0 2.0 3.1
4. Education -0.6 0.3 -0.2 0.2 0.5 0.9
5. Rest -0.6 -0.6 -1.0 -0.3 1.5 1.1
   Source: Author’s calculations based on the EPH, Greater Buenos Aires, september 1986, 1992, 1998.
1.  Returns to education
Table 5.4 confirms the presumptions of section 2. Changes in the returns to education had an
equalizing effect on the individual earnings distribution between 1986 and 1992 and a strong
unequalizing effect in the next six years. The effects on the equivalent income distribution were similar.
Over the whole period 1986-1998, changes in the returns to education (in terms of hourly wages)
represented an important inequality-increasing factor.
2.  Gender wage gap
                                                
18 See our companion paper.
19 According to table 5.4, the observed Gini coefficient of the individual earnings distribution grew 7.2 points
between 1992 and 1998. The price effect is the average over two numbers: (i) the difference between the Gini that
results from applying 1998 vector b to the 1992 distribution and the actual Gini in 1992, and (ii) the difference
between the actual Gini in 1998 and the Gini that results from applying 1992 vector b to the 1998 distribution.
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As it was expected, changes in the gender parameter of the wage equation implied an equalizing
effect on the individual earnings distribution. During the last decade the gender gap has substantially
shrunk. Given that women earn less than men, that movement had an unambiguous inequality-
decreasing effect.
However it is interesting to notice that the gender effect becomes negligible in the equivalent
household labor income distribution.20 Part of the explanation is that female workers are more
concentrated in the upper part of the distribution than men (partly because of their own labor
decisions) and hence a relative wage change may imply an increase in household income inequality.21
However, on the other hand many poor households are headed by working women, and hence an
increase in their relative wages would imply an equalizing effect on the household distribution. It
seems that these effects tend to cancel out.
3. Returns to experience (age)
Changes in the returns to experience (age) implied a non negligible unequalizing effect on the earnings
distribution during the period 1986-1992. A brief explanation is in order. Changes in the returns to
experience within categories (head, spouses and rest) did not have a clear effect on the earnings
distribution of each category. For instance, the Gini coefficient for heads does not significantly change
when the 1992 experience parameters of the wage equation are used to simulate earnings in 1986
(from 37.9 to 38.1). The same is true for the other categories. However, recall from section 2 that
changes in returns to experience between 1986 and 1992 tended to increase wages for heads and
decrease them for spouses. Since heads are mostly men and spouses are nearly exclusively women,
those changes implied an inequality-increasing effect. An opposite pattern shows up between 1992
and 1998, thus implying an equalizing effect.22
It is also interesting to notice that the sign of the experience effect in the equivalent household
income distribution is the opposite as the sign in the individual earnings distribution. Since it was
suggested that the experience effect basically reflects different changes in returns for males and
females, a similar argument as in the gender wage gap can be raised to explain that result. More work
is needed on this point.
4. Unobservables
Changes in endowments and returns to unobservable factors have implied unequalizing changes in
wages, which have translated into unequalizing changes in the individual earnings and equivalent
household labor income distributions. These effects were particularly strong in the 1992-1998 period.
5. Employment
                                                
20 It even becomes unequalizing during 1986-1992.
21 While 44% of working women are in the highest-income quintile of the equivalent household labor income
distribution, only 25% of men are in that quintile. On the other extreme 6% of working women are in the lowest-
income quintile while 9% of men are there.
22 We do not have a clear explanation of the reasons underlying these effects. More work is needed on this point.
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A strong unequalizing employment effect shows up in the individual earnings distribution in period
1992-1998. Notice that since we exclude those individuals with zero earnings from that distribution,
the employment effect is the result of relative changes in the number of hours of work. As it was
discussed in section 2 the nineties witnessed a substantial fall in hours of work by low-income
workers and an increase for the rest. It seems that this fact has had a very significant impact on the
earnings distribution.
Unemployment rate skyrocketed in 1995 and has remained very high since then. It is a
widespread belief that this increase is the main cause of the strong increase in household inequality.
Results in the second panel of table 5.4 suggest to scale down those conclusions. First, the
employment effect on household income is relevant in period 1992-1998 but not significantly different
from other effects, like returns to education or to unobservables. Second, it captures not only
unemployment but also changes in hours of work, which was suggested to be quantitatively very
important.
A couple of reasons contribute to reduce the effect of the great increase in unemployment on
household inequality. The first one was mentioned in section 2. During 1992-1998 the unemployment
rate jumped but the employment rate did not change very much, implying a minor change in the
number of individuals without earnings. As it was stressed before, this is the relevant number for
household inequality, not the number of unemployed people. The second point is that the new
unemployed (those who did not work in 1998 but that would have worked with the 1992
parameters) had extremely low individual incomes in 1992 (just 10% of the rest), but equivalent
household incomes not so far from the mean (50% of the rest). This implies that in the simulation
using the 1992 parameters the change in labor status (from unemployed to employed) of some
individuals would not have a very strong effect on household inequality since (i) anyway those
individuals had very low incomes, and (ii) they were not very concentrated in the lower tail of the
household income distribution.
Naturally, the role of unemployment as the main source of the increase in inequality can be
stressed again if it is argued that the fall in the relative wages of the poorest workers was generated
by a relative higher unemployment rate in that group. However, the evidence on this point is far from
being conclusive. Unemployment rates rose between 1992 and 1998 partly due to the fact that
spouses and youngsters decided to start seeking for a job. This fact suggests that part of the causality
could have been from inequality to unemployment: the drop in wages of low-income household heads
triggered a jump of their relatives from home to the labor market, a fact that could have fed the
increase in unemployment. More work is needed on this point.
6.  Education
Argentina has witnessed a dramatic change in the educational composition of its population in the last
two decades. However, according to the results shown in table 5.4 that change did not have a
substantial effect on earnings inequality. This is not a surprising result according to our discussion in
section 2. The education effect is slightly more unequalizing on the household labor income
distribution, probably as a result of the positive correlation of educational levels within the household.
However the effect is not very significant either.
17
7. Other factors and residuals
The last row in table 5.4 is calculated as a residual. It encompasses the effects of interactions terms
and of many factors not considered in the analysis. According to table 5.4 in general this term is
lower than most of the other terms in the decomposition, implying either that the factors not
considered in the analysis are not extremely important or that they tend to compensate each other.
6. Concluding remarks
This papers contributes to a highly discussed topic in Argentina -the increase in income inequality- by
using a microeconometric decompositions methodology. This technique allows us to assess the
relevance of various factors that affected inequality in the last 12 years. 
The results of the paper suggest that the small change in inequality between 1986 and 1992 is
the result of mild forces that tend to compensate each other. In contrast, between 1992 and 1998
nearly all effects played in the same direction. Changes in the returns to education and experience,
changes in the endowments of unobservable factors and their remunerations, changes in labor supply,
and the transformation of the educational structure of the population have all had some role in
increasing inequality in Argentina to unprecedented levels. Even the decrease in the wage gap
between genders, which is a potential force for reducing inequality, has not induced a significant
decrease in household income inequality.
The increase in the returns to education and to unobservable factors and the relative fall in
hours of work by low-income people are particularly important to “explain” the growth in inequality.
Perhaps surprisingly, although Argentina witnessed dramatic changes in the gender wage gap, the
unemployment rate and the educational structure, these factors appear to have had only a mild effect
on the household income distribution.
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Table 2.1
Gini coefficient
Individual labor income and equivalent household labor income
Greater Buenos Aires, September 1986, 1992 and 1998
1986 1992 1998
Individual labor income 39.4        37.7        44.9        
Equivalent household labor income 40.3        41.0        49.5        
                            Source: Author’s calculations based on the EPH.
Table 2.2
Hourly earnings by educational levels
Greater Buenos Aires, September, 1986, 1992, 1998.
Means ($ 1998) Change (%)
1986 1992 1998 92-86 98-92 98-86
Primary incomplete 6.6 5.7 5.3 -13.6 -6.8 -19.5
Primary complete 7.7 6.3 5.9 -18.1 -6.0 -23.0
Secondary incomplete 9.2 6.8 6.6 -26.1 -2.8 -28.1
Secondary complete 11.6 9.1 9.1 -21.2 -0.4 -21.5
College incomplete 14.5 11.9 10.6 -17.5 -11.1 -26.7
College complete 24.1 16.3 19.4 -32.3 19.1 -19.4
Total 10.4 8.4 9.2 -19.0 9.3 -11.4
                         Source: Author’s calculations based on the EPH.
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Table 2.3
Log hourly earnings equation
Variables Head Spouse Other
Earnings Eq. 1986 1992 1998 1986 1992 1998 1986 1992 1998
pric 0.2150 0.2162 0.1828 0.0393 -0.1731 0.0575 0.0407 0.3349 0.0417
(5.496) (4.011) (2.978) (0.496) (-1.695) (0.462) (0.441) (2.884) (0.287)
seci 0.3994 0.3367 0.3630 0.2241 -0.0243 0.2306 0.2278 0.4361 0.1366
(9.206) (5.661) (5.620) (2.342) (-0.211) (1.848) (2.400) (3.795) (0.953)
secc 0.6219 0.6229 0.6534 0.5595 0.2652 0.4841 0.4053 0.5726 0.3646
(12.649) (10.185) (9.664) (6.720) (2.445) (3.861) (3.927) (4.546) (2.447)
coli 0.9121 0.9516 0.9382 0.6446 0.5173 0.6579 0.5646 0.7100 0.6699
(15.469) (12.713) (12.714) (5.210) (3.666) (4.347) (5.289) (5.919) (4.592)
colc 1.3079 1.2607 1.4634 0.8607 0.5764 0.9607 0.7439 0.8109 0.9456
(22.778) (18.242) (20.282) (7.824) (4.183) (5.600) (5.577) (5.432) (5.830)
male 0.2915 0.1834 0.1675 -0.1865 0.2626 0.2859 0.0454 0.0701 0.1678
(5.106) (3.707) (3.474) (-0.774) (1.280) (1.706) (0.827) (1.405) (3.250)
age 0.0401 0.0546 0.0452 0.0413 0.0343 0.0454 0.0766 0.0797 0.0846
(3.969) (4.882) (3.951) (2.120) (1.533) (2.028) (4.351) (4.267) (4.138)
age2 -0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0011
(-3.295) (-4.661) (-3.155) (-2.057) (-1.393) (-1.813) (-3.646) (-3.545) (-3.735)
young18 -0.0218 -0.0338 -0.3601
(-0.250) (-0.406) (-2.811)
constant 0.5599 0.1959 0.2051 1.0778 1.1095 0.6169 0.1849 -0.2793 -0.3190
(2.400) (0.806) (0.792) (2.554) (2.283) (1.178) (0.577) (-0.749) (-0.799)
Selection Equation (dep. var.=1 if hourly earnings>0)
pric 0.2931 0.2212 0.3955 -0.3295 -0.0513 -0.1975 0.2137 0.5917 0.2573
(2.240) (1.429) (3.052) (-3.289) (-0.381) (-1.346) (1.203) (2.874) (1.126)
seci 0.3494 0.5737 0.4556 -0.1980 0.0129 0.0398 0.2258 0.8538 0.2308
(2.238) (2.987) (3.234) (-1.612) (0.083) (0.258) (1.215) (4.015) (1.021)
secc 0.4875 0.5575 0.5866 -0.0736 0.1556 0.2299 0.4315 0.7899 0.4376
(2.580) (2.827) (3.736) (-0.639) (1.066) (1.489) (1.901) (3.296) (1.829)
coli 0.4760 1.0563 0.4125 0.4776 0.5239 0.4153 0.8123 1.5396 0.5657
(1.827) (3.318) (2.177) (2.355) (2.433) (2.102) (3.441) (5.794) (2.284)
colc 1.2176 1.0181 0.8111 0.7033 1.0577 1.3115 0.8274 1.3888 0.8389
(3.085) (3.750) (4.537) (4.467) (5.620) (7.588) (2.101) (3.766) (2.752)
male 0.8594 0.7840 0.6528 1.2982 1.7185 1.3967 0.8164 0.4630 0.5007
(5.175) (4.001) (5.263) (2.235) (2.970) (5.353) (8.451) (4.703) (6.182)
age 0.1099 0.1141 0.1045 0.1288 0.1757 0.1203 0.1960 0.1686 0.2719
(3.160) (3.012) (3.748) (4.907) (5.577) (4.279) (5.682) (4.836) (9.111)
age2 -0.0014 -0.0016 -0.0014 -0.0017 -0.0023 -0.0015 -0.0029 -0.0022 -0.0036
(-3.541) (-3.589) (-4.269) (-5.117) (-5.668) (-4.353) (-6.385) (-4.832) (-8.656)
married 0.1986 0.1559 0.0588 -0.7813 -0.4060 -0.4761
(1.204) (0.841) (0.477) (-4.386) (-2.373) (-3.360)
children -0.0087 -0.0178 -0.0464 -0.1929 -0.1797 -0.1768
(-0.202) (-0.442) (-1.387) (-6.496) (-5.460) (-5.477)
young18 -0.5983 -0.3063 -0.5995
(-3.823) (-1.925) (-4.087)
attend -0.8669 -1.0407 -0.5569 -0.3036 0.3501 0.2020 -1.6477 -1.7389 -0.9050
(-2.850) (-3.280) (-2.509) (-0.963) (1.040) (0.900) (-11.458) (-11.237) (-7.556)
emphead -0.7922 -0.6382 -0.6148 -0.0351 -0.1624 -0.2210
(-3.982) (-3.314) (-4.386) (-0.212) (-1.112) (-1.951)
empspouse -0.0763 -0.0005 0.0488
(-0.706) (-0.005) (0.547)
constant -1.3555 -1.3567 -1.3239 -1.5356 -2.7184 -1.8346 -2.6080 -2.6912 -4.0987
(-1.892) (-1.682) (-2.296) (-3.015) (-4.571) (-3.390) (-4.233) (-4.358) (-8.127)
Nº Obs. 1961 1404 1967 1575 1116 1413 1292 1090 1631
Chi 2 153.77 124.61 148.96 164.62 154.13 303.14 767.13 590.80 861.41
Log Lik. -1888.35 -1368.31 -2281.71 -1311.55 998.04 -1354.19 -841.52 -769.56 -1191.27
Rho 0.2179 0.6786 0.1247 -0.1691 0.0379 -0.1035 0.1705 0.3726 0.3600
Sigma 0.5562 0.5747 0.6361 0.5603 0.5492 0.6434 0.4848 0.4770 0.5569
Lambda 0.1212 0.3900 0.0793 -0.0948 0.0208 -0.0666 0.0827 0.1777 0.2005
Heckman maximun likelihood estimation. z values in parenthesis. All individuals between 14 and 65 with  valid
answers.
Variables’ definition: pric, seci, secc, coli, and colc equal one if Primary Complete, Secondary Incomplete,
Secondary Complete, College Incomplete, and College Complete, respectively. young 18 equal one if individual is
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less than 18 yeas old. attend equal one if individual attends school. emphead and empspouse equal one if head or
spouse employed, respectively.
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Table 2.4
Hourly earnings by gender
Greater Buenos Aires, September, 1986, 1992, 1998.
Means ($ 1998) Change (%)
1986 1992 1998 92-86 98-92 98-86
Female 9.3 8.1 9.0 -12.6 10.2 -3.7
Male 10.8 8.5 9.3 -21.2 9.0 -14.1
Total 10.4 8.4 9.2 -18.9 9.3 -11.4
                  Source: Author’s calculations based on the EPH.
Table 2.5
Hourly earnings by age groups
Greater Buenos Aires, September, 1986, 1992, 1998.
Means ($ 1998) Change (%)
1986 1992 1998 92-86 98-92 98-86
14-19 5.0 4.7 4.3 -6.7 -7.9 -14.1
20-29 9.0 7.4 6.9 -17.4 -7.5 -23.6
30-39 11.2 9.5 9.5 -14.9 0.4 -14.5
40-49 11.9 9.4 10.8 -21.2 14.8 -9.6
50-59 9.9 8.1 11.2 -18.0 38.1 13.3
60-65 12.9 8.5 9.0 -34.1 6.7 -29.7
Total 10.4 8.4 9.2 -19.0 9.4 -11.4
                  Source: Author’s calculations based on the EPH.
Table 2.6
Weekly hours of work by earnings quintile
Greater Buenos Aires, September, 1986, 1992, 1998.
Means Change (%)
1986 1992 1998 92-86 98-92 98-86
1 37.7 36.7 31.6 -2.7 -13.8 -16.2
2 45.0 43.4 44.5 -3.5 2.5 -1.1
3 46.9 47.6 48.2 1.4 1.2 2.7
4 50.5 49.2 50.7 -2.6 3.2 0.5
5 53.1 51.4 51.5 -3.2 0.2 -3.0
Total 46.5 45.5 45.2 -2.1 -0.8 -2.9
                  Source: Author’s calculations based on the EPH.
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Table 2.7
Hours of work equation
Head Spouse Other
Variables 1986 1992 1998 1986 1992 1998 1986 1992 1998
pric 3.6994 2.9998 9.1412 -12.8134 -0.8331 -3.7478 9.5376 16.5169 9.4156
(3.059) (1.690) (4.416) (-3.047) (-0.158) (-0.694) (2.186) (3.094) (1.467)
seci 3.6777 7.4547 13.2170 -8.1969 1.6344 5.4827 6.1322 19.4012 9.4008
(2.722) (3.780) (6.057) (-1.583) (0.270) (0.973) (1.352) (3.583) (1.484)
secc 4.6707 3.7789 13.1584 -1.4443 8.1426 12.0399 8.5914 17.9790 12.4789
(3.075) (1.853) (5.770) (-0.301) (1.432) (2.135) (1.686) (3.009) (1.890)
coli 3.1701 5.7436 10.8928 16.6182 18.4916 20.2824 24.1386 39.7456 21.8096
(1.552) (2.149) (3.979) (2.095) (2.277) (2.858) (4.185) (5.859) (3.152)
colc 1.7271 5.2378 13.2734 21.8548 32.6159 36.5539 8.2748 23.1498 13.3421
(0.985) (2.255) (5.535) (3.546) (4.806) (6.181) (1.156) (3.108) (1.777)
male 13.0310 11.0772 15.1987 45.2329 44.9860 43.9907 21.8135 14.8407 15.2718
(7.291) (4.845) (8.093) (2.677) (3.380) (6.512) (9.650) (6.134) (7.018)
age 1.5803 0.9534 1.3565 5.4816 6.5939 4.4250 4.7870 3.4066 7.5266
(4.980) (2.468) (3.351) (4.942) (5.414) (4.335) (6.111) (4.049) (9.468)
age2 -0.0212 -0.0150 -0.0186 -0.0722 -0.0850 -0.0562 -0.0714 -0.0468 -0.1020
(-5.620) (-3.248) (-3.895) (-5.098) (-5.455) (-4.368) (-6.934) (-4.130) (-8.948)
married 2.7919 3.3768 4.4988 -15.8565 -7.6537 -12.1374
(1.826) (1.652) (2.608) (-3.813) (-1.818) (-3.241)
children 0.2807 0.0064 -0.4745 -8.7386 -7.3819 -7.3587
(0.835) (0.015) (-1.036) (-7.070) (-5.847) (-6.414)
young18 -18.8104 -14.6823 -23.3702
(-4.861) (-3.618) (-5.426)
attend -14.2282 -16.2041 -13.1575 -13.9652 9.0871 2.5146 -51.2882 -54.3772 -33.9044
(-4.665) (-4.315) (-3.902) (-1.077) (0.772) (0.330) (-14.003) (-13.539) (-10.203)
emphead -28.5008 -25.8924 -19.6188 -4.0485 -5.6771 -3.6361
(-3.686) (-3.669) (-4.138) (-1.095) (-1.619) (-1.224)
empspouse -3.5146 1.2688 0.0257
(-1.327) (0.478) (0.011)
constant 3.5987 17.5783 -3.6110 -70.2406 -99.8388 -70.4622 -51.8461 -43.2795 -108.5699
(0.559) (2.193) (-0.435) (-3.282) (-4.321) (-3.570) (-3.641) (-2.895) (-7.913)
Nº Obs. 1961 1404 1967 1575 1116 1413 1292 1090 1631
Censored 112 97 201 81 705 848 780 609 982
Chi 2 279.96 174.00 292.40 143.34 129.49 252.91 877.47 658.90 941.1300
Log Lik -8148.67 -5880.39 -8369.46 -3111.35 -2502.00 -3352.46 -2769.37 -2602.48 -3576.4700
Pseudo R2 0.0169 0.0146 0.0172 0.0225 0.0252 0.0363 0.1368 0.1124 0.1163
sigma 18.2014 19.6320 24.0450 45.6327 42.6309 40.6468 30.5604 31.4037 33.2833
Tobit maximun likelihood estimation. t ratios in parenthesis. All individuals between 14 and 65 with  valid
answers.
Variables’ definition: pric, seci, secc, coli, and colc equal one if Primary Complete, Secondary Incomplete,
Secondary Complete, College Incomplete, and College Complete, respectively. young 18 equal one if
individual is less than 18 yeas old. attend equal one if individual attends school. emphead and empspouse
equal one if head or spouse employed, respectively.
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Table 2.8
Labor status by role in the household
Greater Buenos Aires, September, 1986, 1992, 1998.
Proportions by group (%)
1986 1992 1998
Heads
Employed 94.6 93.1 89.8
Unemployed 2.0 3.1 5.2
Inactive 3.4 3.8 5.0
Spouses
Employed 31.7 36.8 40.1
Unemployed 1.4 1.7 5.6
Inactive 66.9 61.5 54.3
Other
Employed 39.6 44.1 39.8
Unemployed 4.0 5.9 8.8
Inactive 56.3 50.0 51.4
All
Employed 59.4 60.9 59.5
Unemployed 2.3 3.5 6.5
Inactive 38.3 35.6 34.0
                                                Source: Author’s calculations based on the EPH.
Table 2.9
Labor status by education
Greater Buenos Aires, September, 1986, 1992, 1998
Propo r t i ons  by  g roup  (%)
1986 1992 1998
Pr imary  i ncomp le te
Emp loyed 60 .6 53 .3 55 .3
Unemp loyed 3 . 1 4 . 6 8 . 5
Inac t i ve 36 .3 42 .2 36 .2
Pr ima ry  comp le te
Emp loyed 60 .1 63 .7 61 .5
Unemp loyed 2 . 6 3 . 8 7 . 7
Inac t i ve 37 .4 32 .5 30 .8
Seconda ry  i ncomp le te
Emp loyed 46 .1 47 .3 42 .9
Unemp loyed 2 . 2 2 . 6 5 . 6
Inac t i ve 51 .7 50 .1 51 .5
S e c o n d a r y  c o m p l e t e
Emp loyed 66 .3 68 .6 71 .5
Unemp loyed 1 . 5 3 . 9 6 . 3
Inac t i ve 32 .2 27 .5 22 .2
Co l lege  i ncomp le te
Emp loyed 65 .9 66 .0 60 .7
Unemp loyed 2 . 6 4 . 5 6 . 8
Inac t i ve 31 .5 29 .6 32 .5
Co l l ege  comp le te
Emp loyed 86 .4 88 .3 88 .8
Unemp loyed 1 . 4 1 . 9 4 . 8
Inac t i ve 12 .2 9 . 9 6 . 4
All
Emp loyed 59 .4 60 .9 59 .5
Unemp loyed 2 . 3 3 . 5 6 . 5
Inac t i ve 38 .3 35 .6 34 .0
                                              Source: Author’s calculations based on the EPH.
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Table 2.10
Sample composition by educational level
(proportions in the sample)
Greater Buenos Aires, September, 1986, 1992, 1998.
1986 1992 1998
Primary incomplete 15.4 11.0 7.3
Primary complete 32.0 31.1 25.2
Secondary incomplete 26.0 26.8 30.6
Secondary complete 13.5 15.8 15.2
College incomplete 7.1 8.1 11.7
College complete 6.0 7.3 10.0
                                            Source: Author’s calculations based on the EPH.
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Table 5.1
Decompositions of the change in the Gini coefficient
Individual earnings and equivalent household income
Greater Buenos Aires, 1986-1992
Using 1992 coefficients
  Individual earnings   Equivalent income
Level Change Level Change
1986 observed 39.4 40.3
1992 observed 37.7 -1.7 41.0 0.7
Effects 
1. Price 38.8 -0.6 39.7 -0.6
    education 38.9 -0.5 39.7 -0.6
    gender 38.4 -1.0 40.4 0.1
    experience 41.5 2.1 40.0 -0.3
    rest -1.3 0.2
2. Unobservables 39.9 0.5 40.7 0.4
3. Employment 39.8 0.4 41.6 1.3
4. Education 39.2 -0.2 40.5 0.1
5. Rest -1.8 -0.5
Using 1986 coefficients
  Individual earnings   Equivalent income
Level Change Level Change
1986 observed 39.4 -1.7 40.3 0.7
1992 observed 37.7 41.0
Effects 
1. Price 38.5 -0.8 41.5 -0.5
    education 39.2 -1.5 42.2 -1.2
    gender 38.8 -1.1 40.9 0.1
    experience 36.4 1.3 41.7 -0.7
    rest 0.5 1.2
2. Unobservables 37.2 0.5 40.7 0.3
3. Employment 38.7 -1.0 40.3 0.7
4. Education 38.6 -1.0 40.8 0.2
5. Rest 0.6 -0.1
Average changes
  Individual   Equivalent
earnings income
Observed 86-92 -1.7 0.7
Effects 
1. Price -0.7 -0.5
    education -1.0 -0.9
    gender -1.0 0.1
    experience 1.7 -0.5
    rest -0.4 0.7
2. Unobservables 0.5 0.4
3. Employment -0.3 1.0
4. Education -0.6 0.2
5. Rest -0.6 -0.3
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Table 5.2
Decompositions of the change in the Gini coefficient
Individual earnings and equivalent household income
Greater Buenos Aires, 1992-1998
Using 1998 coefficients
  Individual earnings   Equivalent income
Level Change Level Change
1992 observed 37.7 41.0
1998 observed 44.9 7.2 49.5 8.5
Effects 
1. Price 40.7 3.1 43.5 2.4
    education 40.8 3.2 43.8 2.7
    gender 37.3 -0.4 41.0 0.0
    experience 36.8 -0.9 41.9 0.8
    rest 1.2 -1.1
2. Unobservables 39.9 2.2 42.8 1.8
3. Employment 40.5 2.8 43.1 2.1
4. Education 38.2 0.5 41.3 0.2
5. Rest -1.4 1.9
Using 1992 coefficients
  Individual earnings   Equivalent income
Level Change Level Change
1992 observed 37.7 7.2 41.0 8.5
1998 observed 44.9 49.5
Effects 
1. Price 41.9 3.0 46.5 3.0
    education 42.2 2.7 46.5 3.0
    gender 45.3 -0.4 49.6 -0.1
    experience 45.9 -1.0 48.8 0.7
    rest 1.8 -0.5
2. Unobservables 43.1 1.8 48.0 1.5
3. Employment 42.9 2.0 47.5 2.0
4. Education 44.8 0.1 48.7 0.8
5. Rest 0.2 1.1
Average changes
  Individual   Equivalent
earnings income
Observed 92-98 7.2 8.5
Effects 
1. Price 3.0 2.7
    education 2.9 2.8
    gender -0.4 -0.1
    experience -0.9 0.7
    rest 1.5 -0.8
2. Unobservables 2.0 1.7
3. Employment 2.4 2.0
4. Education 0.3 0.5
5. Rest -0.6 1.5
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Table 5.3
Decompositions of the change in the Gini coefficient
Individual earnings and equivalent household income
Greater Buenos Aires, 1986-1998
Using 1998 coefficients
  Individual earnings   Equivalent income
Level Change Level Change
1986 observed 39.4 40.3
1998 observed 44.9 5.5 49.5 9.2
Effects 
1. Price 41.4 2.0 42.2 1.9
    education 41.1 1.7 42.0 1.7
    gender 38.1 -1.3 40.5 0.1
    experience 39.8 0.4 40.6 0.2
    rest 1.2 -0.2
2. Unobservables 42.2 2.8 42.7 2.4
3. Employment 42.2 2.8 43.5 3.2
4. Education 39.8 0.4 41.2 0.9
5. Rest -2.5 0.8
Using 1986 coefficients
  Individual earnings   Equivalent income
Level Change Level Change
1986 observed 39.4 5.5 40.3 9.2
1998 observed 44.9 49.5
Effects 
1. Price 42.8 2.1 47.4 2.1
    education 43.0 1.9 47.6 1.9
    gender 46.4 -1.5 49.7 -0.2
    experience 44.5 0.4 49.2 0.3
    rest 1.3 0.1
2. Unobservables 42.7 2.2 47.7 1.8
3. Employment 43.3 1.6 46.5 3.0
4. Education 45.7 -0.8 48.5 1.0
5. Rest 0.4 1.3
Average changes
  Individual   Equivalent
earnings income
Observed 86-98 5.5 9.2
Effects 
1. Price 2.1 2.0
    education 1.8 1.8
    gender -1.4 0.0
    experience 0.4 0.3
    rest 1.2 0.0
2. Unobservables 2.5 2.1
3. Employment 2.2 3.1
4. Education -0.2 0.9
5. Rest -1.0 1.1
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Figure 2.1
Gini coefficient of equivalent household income
Greater Buenos Aires, September 1985-1998
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                               Source: Author’s calculations based on the EPH.
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Figure 2.2
Hourly earnings-education profiles
Men 40 years old
Household heads
0
5
10
15
20
25
prii pric seci secc coli colc
education
h
o
u
rl
y
 e
a
rn
in
g
s
Other members
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
prii pric seci secc coli colc
education
h
o
u
rl
y
 e
a
rn
in
g
s
____ 1986  __ __ 1992  _ _ _  1998
32
Figure 2.3
Hourly earnings-education profiles
Women 40 years old
Spouses
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
prii pric seci secc coli colc
education
h
o
u
rl
y
 e
a
rn
in
g
s
Other members
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
prii pric seci secc coli colc
education
h
o
u
rl
y
 e
a
rn
in
g
s
 
____ 1986  __ __ 1992  _ _ _  1998
33
Figure 2.4
Weekly hours of work by educational level
Male heads 40 years old
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